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DOES THE VEDA HAVE AN AUTHOR? 
A reply to Professor Stephen H. Phillips 
(Études Asiatiques / Asiatische Studien 52(1), 1998, pp. 5-14.) 
 
 
 During the IXth World Sanskrit Conference, held in Melbourne in January 1994, 
Professor Stephen H. Phillips used the time reserved for his paper to virulently attack 
me personally and a review which I had written of the book Íabdapramåˆa: Word and 
Knowledge, by Puru∑ottama Bilimoria. Phillips' attack has since been published (in a 
much more measured tone) in Philosophy East & West (45(2), 1995, pp. 273-279) as a 
feature review of that same book. Professor Greg Bailey (one of the organisers of the 
conference where Phillips read his paper) has asked me to respond to this attack. Bailey 
seems to think that the discussion initiated by Phillips could in this way have some 
theoretical interest. I am not sure whether his expectation will be fulfilled. As I 
understand it, the difference between Phillips and me is of an altogether different nature. 
 Most of Phillips' attack consists of general reflections, accompanied by vague 
allegations, such as: "Bronkhorst's review shows that he is unfamiliar with issues of 
philosophy", "Bronkhorst seems to have little respect for philosophy as such", 
"Bronkhorst does not know what he is talking about". This does not of course help 
much to find out what exactly in my review he finds fault with. However, on a few 
occasions he criticises my exact words. Let us consider these specific criticisms. 
Obviously, only these could conceivably constitute the basis for a constructive 
discussion. 
 Unfortunately most of what Phillips writes about my actual words is sadly 
besides the point. One of the passages which provoked Phillips' ire reads as follows (JB 
p. 103): 
 
Take the fundamental dogma of M¥måµså and Vedånta, according to which the 
Veda has no author, be he human or divine. Bilimoria finds this claim 
‘preposterous’ (p. 19), and proposes a way "to make sense of this sort of a talk 
about ‘text without an author’", viz., "to look upon it as an ontological claim, not 
about language, but about the truths conveyed through language" (p. 21). 
 
Phillips comments as follows (SP p. 274): 
 
According to Bronkhorst (p. 103), Bilimoria finds the claim that the Veda has no 
author (apauru∑eya) "preposterous". But in fact what Bilimoria says is, "This [the 
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doctrine of apauru∑eya] appears, on the face of it, to be a preposterous claim" [6] 
(p. 19). Surely, apauru∑eya does seem to be, prima facie, or at first blush, a 
preposterous claim. In fact, Bilimoria comes around not so much to defending 
apauru∑eya but to using it as a “methodological device for the possibility of 
understanding ßruti” (p. 21), a step on a ladder to appreciating Vedåntin and 
M¥måµsaka views and, beyond that, a veritable defense of ßabda-pramåˆa … . 
Thus Bronkhorst’s representation is, in its face, outrageous, given what 
Bilimoria actually says. 
 
This passage confirms the impression which I derived from Íabdapramåˆa, namely, that 
the claim that the Veda has no author is unacceptable, to Bilimoria, but also, it seems, to 
Phillips. It can only be accepted, according to Bilimoria, if one understands it to mean 
that the truths conveyed through language (the Veda?) have no author. The claim that 
the Veda itself has no author “appears, on the face of it, to be a preposterous claim”, 
and, unless I misunderstand both Bilimoria and Phillips, is indeed preposterous 
according to both of them, at least in this literal form. This is what I read in Bilimoria’s 
book, and again in Phillips’ review. But whether or not I understand these two authors 
correctly here, the main issue is left untouched by Phillips. What I protested against is 
that Bilimoria imputes a different interpretation to an established doctrine of M¥måµså. 
Phillips does not comment upon this, but chooses rather to make a fuss around the word 
‘preposterous’. This against the background that Bilimoria (and he himself) agree that 
the claim that the Veda has no author is incorrect. 
 The above passage illustrates how Phillips fusses about individual words, 
without addressing the issue at stake. The following passage shows this even more 
clearly. Let me first cite my own words (JB p. 103-04): 
 
It is of course not possible to reject (or rather, reinterpret) a dogma as central as 
that of the apauru∑eyatva of the Veda without inflicting damage to other aspects 
of M¥måµså and Vedånta thought. The very presence of an authoritative body of 
texts without author induced the M¥måµsakas and the Vedåntins to accept that 
words by themselves — not spoiled by an unreliable or ignorant author, or by 
some other defect — constitute a means of valid cognition. This so-called 
svata˙pråmåˆya guarantees the validity of the words of the Veda, precisely 
because they have no author. Moreover, because they deal with invisible things, 
they cannot conflict with any other means of valid cognition. 
 
Phillips comments (SP p. 274): 
 
Bronkhorst … says, “The very presence of an authoritative body of texts without 
author induced the M¥måµsakas and the Vedåntins to accept that words by 
themselves — not spoiled by an unreliable or ignorant author, or by some other 
defect — [7] constitute a means of valid cognition. This so-called 
svata˙pråmåˆya guarantees the validity of the words of the Veda, precisely 
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because they have no author." Note Bronkhorst's expression "precisely because". 
His next sentence also contains a "because" ("Moreover, because they [the 
words of the Veda] deal with invisible things, they cannot conflict with any 
other means of valid cognition"), so I guess it is not precisely, or only, because 
of apauru∑eya that the Veda is to be regarded as having svata˙pråmåˆya (but 
also because the Veda deals with invisible things). 
 
It is probably kindest to Professor Phillips to assume that he, while writing this passage, 
confused English and Sanskrit syntax. It is true that the word "because" occurs twice, 
but in two different sentences, which present the causes of two different things 
altogether: 1) the words of the Veda are valid, because they have no author; and 2) the 
words of the Veda cannot conflict with any other means of valid cognition, because they 
deal with invisible things. I find it somewhat alarming that I have to explain these 
simple sentences to someone who professionally works with texts, even though not 
perhaps primarily as a philologist but as a philosopher. More important is that Phillips, 
here again, attacks some words used in my review, without addressing the issue at stake. 
Does he feel critical towards my review because of my use of words? Or is there a more 
substantial reason behind his grudge? 
 Phillips describes the difference between us on the first page of his review (SP p. 
273): 
 
[A] main concern of mine is the question of how it is possible for Bronkhorst 
and myself to have such different reactions, and appraisals, of Bilimoria's book. 
The gap in our responses may have to do with opposition between the goals and 
methods of Indology, on the one hand, and the nature of philosophical 
engagement, on the other. I hope not. The two disciplines should be 
complementary, not antagonistic. I shall present reflections on this possible 
opposition, and in the process what I think about Bilimoria's book will become 
clear. 
 It is indisputable that there are, broadly, the two distinct scholarly approaches to 
Sanskrit philosophical texts that we group as the Indological, which is 
philological and historical in orientation, and the philosophical, which is, at 
bottom, evaluative. There are, accordingly, two groups of scholars: professors of 
Indology and a motley crew of philosophers working on classical Sanskrit texts. 
Indological readings are attuned to questions of intellectual history, aimed 
toward an understanding of the Sanskrit text or texts within the relevant history 
of ideas and, sometimes, within a broader cultural context. Philosophical 
readings aim at evaluation, the deciding of what we should believe about 
specified topics and why — normally the very topics addressed by the Sanskrit 
text being studied. The philosophic approach makes the text party to 
contemporary philosophic discussions; the [8] Indological approach typically 
does not. Bronkhorst's worst mistake appears to be a failure to appreciate the 
evaluative engagement in Bilimoria's writing. 
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Contrary to what Phillips thinks, I have no difficulty with the evaluative approach to 
Sanskrit philosophical texts. In the case of the idea that the Veda has no beginning and 
no author there will indeed be few readers — not excluding die-hard philologists — 
who do not make such an assessment. Everyone (except perhaps some very traditional 
Indians) will agree that "we should not believe it", to borrow Phillips' words. And the 
reasons for this rejection are not primarily philosophical. Such an idea does not fit in 
with the scientific view of the world current today. We now believe that human beings 
were not always around, and nor was the universe. A continuous tradition of Vedic 
recitation is, for us, confronted with questions like the following: Was there Vedic 
recitation before there were human beings? or before the Big Bang? 
 We have seen that also Bilimoria (and Phillips) do not accept the idea of a 
literally authorless Veda. Had Bilimoria stopped here, I would not have hesitated to 
express my agreement. But he did not stop here. He does not simply evaluate, he 
reinterprets. To repeat the words cited in my review: he proposes a way "to make sense 
of this sort of a talk about ‘text without an author’", viz., "to look upon it as an 
ontological claim, not about language, but about the truths conveyed through language". 
Nowhere in his review does Phillips hint at this crucial dimension of Bilimoria's 
"evaluation". Quite on the contrary, he maintains (SP p. 275): "In accordance with the 
properly philosophic task of evaluation, Bilimoria finds merit and faults with a wide 
range of classical Indian epistemology, but he has not, contra Bronkhorst, tried to adjust 
or reinterpret to meet modern tastes." If Phillips is right, Bilimoria thinks that the 
Sanskrit authors he studies considered the talk about "text without an author" as an 
ontological claim about the truths conveyed through language. And Phillips, too, seems 
to accept this position, or at the very least he considers it a position worth considering. 
 I have found this position profoundly puzzling from the moment I first came 
across it in Bilimoria's book. I failed to see what could possibly have led Bilimoria into 
accepting it. However, it seems that I have meanwhile reached some degree of 
understanding in this regard. It now seems clear to me that Bilimoria (and Phillips?) 
reject the classical M¥måµså position according to which the Veda is eternal and 
without [9] beginning, and find themselves as a result confronted with the problem to 
which they try to find a solution. Let me explain. 
 The general (and in my opinion correct) understanding of the M¥måµså position 
is that the Veda literally has no beginning: just as every present-day teacher of Vedic 
recitation has learned his skills from a teacher, so every teacher in the past had a teacher 
who taught him. There is no beginning to this tradition of recitation, there never was a 
first reciter (or teacher), and consequently, there was no "author" of the Veda either. 
This view is peculiar from a modern Western perspective, but it is coherent, and by no 
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means preposterous. Seen in this way, the Veda is literally eternal, i.e., without 
beginning, and literally without author. 
 I suspect that Bilimoria (and Phillips) do not think that the M¥måµså position 
was like this. They seem to believe — or take for granted — that the M¥måµsakas 
accepted that the Veda had a beginning in time. But of course, if one accepts that the 
Veda had a beginning in time, the claim that it had no author becomes highly peculiar, 
or indeed preposterous. Someone must, on that assumption, have recited, or thought of, 
the text of the Veda for the first time. Why not call him the author? On this 
understanding of the M¥måµså position it becomes understandable that Bilimoria starts 
trying "to make sense of this sort of a talk about ‘text without an author’". 
 Is this really the way Bilimoria understands the M¥måµså position? 
Unfortunately his writings (or at least the writings to which I have had access) are not at 
all clear about this issue. They often seem to take for granted that the Veda must have 
had a beginning, but they rarely reject in so many words the opposite view, according to 
which the Veda had no beginning in time. However, Bilimoria does discuss a number of 
times the term autpattika, which occurs in M¥måµså SËtra 1.1.5: autpattikas tu 
ßabdasyårthena sambandha˙ "The relation between word and meaning is autpattika". 
Íabara explains this term to mean nitya, which normally means "eternal", but not here, 
according to Bilimoria (1989: 159; cp. 1994: 190; 1995: 142 f.): 
 
Nitya has the more general connotation of "eternity", "outside time", 
"beginningless" and so on ... . But here the term "nitya", as Biardeau rightly 
points out, "does not connote eternity nor does it even specifically refer to 
permanence"; rather it has the sense of an "internal exigency" (svåbhåvika). 
[10] 
One may or may not agree with Bilimoria's understanding of the words autpattika and 
nitya. But even if one agrees with him that nitya does not here mean "eternal", does this 
imply that the Veda is not eternal, i.e. beginningless, either? Bilimoria seems to take this 
for granted, for he takes this observation about the relation of words and their meanings 
as point of departure for explaining in his own special way how the M¥måµsaka could 
look upon the Veda as being apauru∑eya, without author. 
 I assume that everyone (including Bilimoria and Phillips) would agree that 
Bilimoria's attempts to explain what is meant by authorlessness are besides the point, if 
only it can be shown that the M¥måµsakas, at least from Íabara onward, really believed 
that the Veda literally had no beginning. If the Veda has been handed down from 
(literally) beginningless time, there is obviously no place for an author, for an author 
must stand at the beginning of his work, which we now assume never to have existed. Is 
it possible to prove that the M¥måµsakas looked upon the Veda as literally 
beginningless? 
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 Sheldon Pollock (1989: 607-608) has recently pointed out that basically two 
arguments are presented by the M¥måµsakas in support of the apauru∑eyatva of the 
Veda. Empirical grounds are supposed to show that the recitation of the Veda must be 
beginningless. The second argument Pollock describes as follows: "The transcendent 
character of the Vedas, which is proved by the fact of their having no beginning in time 
and no author, is confirmed by their contents: the Vedas show no dimension whatever 
of historical referentiality. Allusions to historical persons or to historical sequentiality 
are only apparently so." He gives the following example from the Íåbara Bhå∑ya: 
"[T]he Vedic sentence ‘Babara Pråvåhaˆi [son of Pravåha[ˆa]] once desired ...’ ... — 
which might establish a terminus post quem for the composition of the text (i.e., after 
Pravåha[ˆa] begot Babara) — contains merely phonemic resemblances to the names of 
historical persons ... . ‘Etymological’ analysis shows that the references are in fact to 
eternally existing entities (in the case in question, to the ‘howling wind’)." 
 I have discussed this and other similar examples in another publication 
(Bronkhorst, 1997). They prove beyond doubt that the Veda, as seen by Íabara, had 
(literally) no beginning and therefore (literally) no author. Interestingly, Bilimoria 
shows some awareness of this point of view in the case of later M¥måµså authors 
(Bilimoria, 1989: 160): "We should explain, however, that in later M¥måµså thinking, 
Íabara's use of ‘nitya’ in the context of autpattika was taken literally to mean ‘eternal’ 
... . Thus [11] Pårthasårathi Mißra, here following Kumårila, takes the relation of ßabda 
and artha to be inexorably invariant, permanent, even eternal. And he argues that since 
the relation between word and meaning is eternal, we cannot be in error with Vedic 
sentences, as we might with ordinary utterances where conventions have so altered the 
otherwise fixed meanings with their respective words. That is why the ordinary 
utterance is not an inerrant means of knowledge (pramåˆa), unless it comes from a 
trustworthy person."1 (I would like to add, pace Phillips, that the words of the Veda are 
valid, precisely because they have no author.) 
 Bilimoria's discussion has a tendency to shift back and forth between the Veda 
and language in general. In the passage just cited he points out that the classical 
M¥måµsakas took the relation of ßabda and artha to be eternal, without adding that they 
believed the Veda to be eternal. But they did. The final section of Kumårila's 
Ílokavårttika, commented upon by Pårthasårathi Mißra, is called precisely 
Vedanityatådhikaraˆa "section on the eternality of the Veda". And Peri Sarveswara 
Sharma (1994: 58 f.) has drawn attention to passages from the Saµbandhåk∑epapar¥k∑å 
                                                
1 The last two sentences read like a non sequitur, for they suggest that trustworthy persons distinguish 
themselves primarily by not following the "conventions [which] have so altered the otherwise fixed 
meanings with their respective words". As important is of course that the trustworthy person is 
trustworthy. 
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of the same work that prove its beginninglessness. This belief is crucial. It is not just 
language, or the relation between words and meanings, that are eternal, but the Veda, 
this concrete body of texts that was being memorised and recited (and to some extent 
still is), which was believed to be literally eternal, i.e., without beginning. 
 In a more recent publication Bilimoria (1995: 152) refers to Pollock's above-
mentioned article, but avoids the crucial issue of the literal beginninglessness of the 
Veda, or rather: he demonstrates that he is unable to take it seriously. He describes the 
situation as follows (p. 153): 
 
Indeed, the M¥måµså draws on the very facti[c]ity of forgotten origins of the 
oral tradition and turns this to its own advantage. M¥måµså argues that as long 
as it is humanly possible to recollect, there is no knowledge of the authors of the 
Veda: all we know is that the text was heard by our fathers, our fathers heard it 
from their fathers and forefathers, and this line of hearing, goes all the way back 
to the ancients, who also heard them. Thus there is a historically continuous 
succession of non-authoring "hearers" (ßrotr[i]yas). This is why the Veda is 
called Íruti, or [12] ßrautagrantha. It is not self-evident nor is there any real 
evidence that the Veda began with some one person or group. This indeed is the 
mystery. 
 
This may indeed be a mystery to Bilimoria, but the M¥måµsakas do not present it as 
one. They do not merely say that we do not know who the author was, they claim 
emphatically that there was none. 
 All this means that Bilimoria addresses a problem (the "preposterous" 
assumption of a Veda that has come into being without author) which he has created 
himself. No one, and certainly not the classical M¥måµsakas, believe that the Veda has 
come into being without an author, for the classical M¥måµsakas believed that the Veda 
has never come into being, for the simple reason that it always was there. But this fact 
— that it always was there — excludes the possibility of an author. Bilimoria's solution 
to his problem — which involves references to a variety of modern views about 
language — is therefore of no interest for the study of M¥måµså, because Bilimoria has 
fundamentally misunderstood a basic tenet of that school of thought. More precisely, 
Bilimoria has not been able to step outside his modern world view and has 
superimposed upon classical M¥måµså ideas which do not belong to it. 
 It remains to be pointed out that the Vedånta position is not completely identical 
with the (PËrva-)M¥måµså one. Both agree that the Veda is without beginning, to be 
sure, but the Vedåntins accept that the Veda is newly pronounced at each creation, 
whereas the M¥måµsakas do not believe in such repeated creations. The differences 
between the two points of view are described in the portion of the Vedåntaparibhå∑å 
reproduced at the end of Bilimoria's book — but not, as far as I can see, discussed in its 
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main body —, so that a simple translation of the relevant passages can here suffice. 
There we read:2 
[13] 
The M¥måµsakas who occupy themselves with the sacrifice (i.e. the PËrva-
M¥måµsakas) maintain that the Vedas are valid because they are eternal and 
therefore free from all human faults. In our opinion (i.e., that of the Vedåntins), 
on the other hand, the Veda is not eternal, because it has an origin. 
[Objection:] The fact that the Vedas have an origin and have been made by God 
proves that they have an author; such being the case, your position according to 
which the Vedas have no author is shown to be incorrect. 
[Reply:] Not so, for "having an author" does not, to begin with, mean "being 
uttered by a person". Nor does it mean "having an origin that depends on a 
person". 
To explain: at the beginning of creation God made the Veda in such a way that 
its composition is identical to the composition of the Veda established during the 
previous creation, not a different Veda. The Vedas have, as a result, no author in 
the sense that they are not the object of an utterance that is independent of a 
similar utterance (made during an earlier creation). The utterance of the 
Mahåbhårata etc., on the other hand, is  independent of a similar utterance 
(during an earlier creation), and therefore these texts do have an author. In this 
way tradition has been defined as being divided into parts that have and those 
that do not have an author. 
 
Instead of a beginningless tradition of recitation, the Vedånta of the Vedåntaparibhå∑å 
accepts a beginningless series of creations. In each of these creations the Veda (or the 
Vedas; the text appears to use both expressions interchangeably) is newly introduced, 
but in exactly the same form as before. The result is that the Veda may not be eternal (it 
supposedly does not exist during the periods separating succeeding creations), but it 
certainly is beginningless and therefore without author. 
 Back to Phillips. I invite Professor Phillips to first pronounce himself on the 
question whether the Veda, from the point of view of M¥måµså and Vedånta, was 
literally beginningless or not. If he agrees with me that it was (what else could he do?), I 
would then like him to explain what is, against that background, so preposterous about 
the claim that the Veda had no author, and why Bilimoria needs to invoke the views of 
various modern thinkers (among them Husserl, de Saussure, Gadamer, Derrida) in order 
to solve a non-problem. I also urge him to explain, or withdraw, his statement (SP p. 
275) to the effect that Bilimoria "has not ... tried to adjust or reinterpret to meet modern 
                                                
2  Bilimoria, 1988: 332-33, § 48-49, 53-55 (errors corrected): vedånåµ nityatvena 
nirastasamastapuµdË∑aˆatayå pråmåˆyam ity adhvaram¥måµsakå˙/ asmåkaµ tu mate vedo na nitya˙ 
utpattimattvåt/ .../ nanu ... utpattimattvena parameßvarakart®katayå pauru∑eyatvasiddhau apauru∑eyatvaµ 
vedånåm iti tavåpi siddhånto bhajyeta/ iti cet na/ na hi tåvat puru∑eˆa uccåryamåˆatvaµ pauru∑eyatvam/ 
... nåpi puru∑ådh¥notpattikatvaµ [pauru∑eyatvam]/ ... kiµtu sajåt¥yoccåraˆånapek∑occåraˆavi∑ayatvaµ 
pauru∑eyetvam/ tathå ca sargådyakåle parameßvara˙ pËrvasargasiddhavedånupËrv¥samånånupËrv¥kaµ 
vedaµ viracitavån/ na tu tadvijåt¥yaµ vedam/ iti na sajåt¥yoccåraˆånapek∑occåraˆavi∑ayatvaµ 
pauru∑eyatvaµ [vedånåm]/ [mahå]bhåratåd¥nåµ tu sajåt¥yoccåraˆam anapek∑yaivoccåraˆam iti te∑åµ 
pauru∑eyatvam/ evam pauru∑eyåpauru∑eyabhedena ågamo dvividho nirËpita˙/. I translate pauru∑eya with 
"having an author". 
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tastes". A business-like discussion of these points would seem to me more profitable 
than a renewed enumeration of my intellectual and academic shortcomings. 
 
[14] 
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